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ABSTRACT 
The Canadian union certification system guarantees workers rights to 
organise, bargain collectively, and strike only when a majority of co-
workers favours unionisation.  This contravenes International Labour 
Organisation standards, in which the freedom to associate is unqualified 
by majority support.  In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
drawn on ILO principles to interpret constitutional rights as covering 
organising and collective bargaining activities related to freedom of 
association under section 2(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.   
However, it has not as yet ordered Canadian governments to enact labour 
relations laws consistent with these new constitutional rights.  Neither has 
there been a general call for such legislative change.  Instead, many fear 
that statutory support for non-majority unionism would lead to multi-
union representation and intensified inter-union competition, but fail to 
consider that sharing the workplace might actually promote inter-union 
cooperation against a common adversary in management.  This study 
addresses this shortcoming by looking at the extent and nature of inter-
union collaboration in New Zealand, where non-majority, non-exclusive 
representation exists already. Collaboration was found to be common, not 
only over bargaining and lobbying, but also in organising.  Implications for 
Canada are explored.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Canadian union certification and representation are characterised by 
majoritarianism and exclusivity. The system is majoritarian in the sense that 
workers’ access to union representation critically depends upon whether the 
union can secure majority support from the relevant bargaining unit of 
workers, either through an election or, in most jurisdictions in Canada, ‘on the 
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cards.’1  If a union can only garner minority support, workers are denied union 
representation; they must continue to contract individually with the employer.  
The system is exclusive in the sense that, once a union is certified to represent 
a particular bargaining unit, no worker in that bargaining unit may be 
represented by another union in negotiating an alternative collective 
agreement.  The exclusivity principle also gives the certified union sole control 
over pursuing personal grievances on behalf of one or more workers in the 
bargaining unit.   Although unions have a duty to fairly represent employees in 
personal grievances cases, unions still maintain the final say on how, when, 
and whether to pursue such grievances.  Such a system is the polar opposite of 
New Zealand’s, where multiple unions may represent workers from the same 
work group, even when there is no majority support for any particular union.  
Drawing on the New Zealand experience, this paper explores the implications 
for Canada of legislatively supporting multi-union and non-majority union 
representation. In particular, this paper examines the issue of inter-union 
collaboration, an area largely under-studied because of a general belief that 
multi-unionism is necessarily associated with chaos and conflict rather than 
cooperation. 
 
The majoritarian and exclusivity principles contravene the International Labour 
Organisation’s (ILO) conventions #s 87 and 98 (Adams, 2009a; 2009b).  These 
conventions together establish rights to organise into unions (workers’ 
organisations), bargain collectively through these unions, and strike, as 
fundamental human rights.  For instance, Convention 87 states that “workers 
and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to 
establish, and subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join 
organisations of their own choosing...”   Because of majoritarian exclusivity, 
Canadian workers may not bargain collectively through an organisation of 
“their own choosing”, if a majority of the co-workers in their bargaining unit 
has chosen (for example, voted for) a different union.  However, the ILO’s 
Committee on Freedom of Association and its Committee of Experts are 
prepared to accept such a restriction on freedom of association as reasonable, 
because workers in these circumstances have some access to collective 
representation, even if it is not their most preferred (Adams, 2009a, 2009b).  
On the other hand, if a majority of co-workers opposes having a union (for 
example, votes against it), workers in the minority have no right to organise 
                                                          
1
 Employees sign the cards and pay a nominal fee (for example, $1) to show that they 
want a particular union to represent their interests.  The cards are then presented to the 
relevant labour relations board to prove that a majority of employees in a given 
bargaining unit favour the union.  In many Canadian jurisdictions, card evidence can be 
sufficient to justify certification, as long as a minimum percent (for example, 55%, 
60%) of employees in the unit have signed a card.  An election is therefore not always 
or even usually necessary.   
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into workers’ organisations (such as unions, staff association), bargain 
collectively, and strike. It is this scenario which is seen as particularly 
problematic by the ILO committees, because it effectively denies any form of 
collective representation to those in the minority who might want it (ILO,  
1994).   
 
In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has invoked ILO principles 
in deriving a constitutional right to organise and bargain collectively as key 
dimensions of the freedom of association in section 2(d) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Fudge, 2008).   In BC Health Services, the SCC 
alluded to ILO documents in acknowledging that the freedom of association 
encompasses the activities of labour unions such as organising and collective 
bargaining (Fudge, 2008).  It also argued  that “the Charter should be 
presumed to provide at least as great a level of protection as is found in the 
international human rights documents that Canada has ratified,”2 again 
referring to ILO documents.   With this in mind, the Court determined that the 
state, as employer and legislator, ought not to “substantially interfere” with 
the “association activities” of workers; in particular, the “intent or effect” of 
the state’s actions “must (not) seriously undercut or undermine the activity of 
workers joining together to pursue the common goals of negotiating 
workplace conditions and terms of employment.”3  In this case, the British 
Columbia government should not have suspended health workers’ right to 
bargain collectively via their unions, as a precursor to lowering wages and 
conditions in order to cut healthcare costs and improve the government’s poor 
fiscal position. A constitutional right to bargain collectively has been 
established (Adams, 2009a, 2009b; Fudge, 2008).    
 
Likewise, in the Dunmore case4, the SCC concluded that the state should not 
have excluded Ontario agriculture workers from the labour relations legislation 
protecting the right to organise.  The rights of minority and vulnerable groups 
must not be readily circumscribed to advance the interests of other groups; in 
this case the owners of economically marginal family farms.    More generally, 
the state was held to have a positive obligation to “extend protective 
legislation to unprotected groups” to make the freedom to associate truly 
meaningful.5   In other words, the Court stands prepared to compel the state 
to enact labour laws, extending workers’ constitutional rights to organise and 
bargain collectively to non-statutory and non-majority unions (Adams, 2010).  
However, at this juncture, the SCC has furnished no indications of how this 
                                                          
2
  Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. 
British Columbia, (2007) 2 S.C.R. 391, 2007 SSC 27, at para 70.  
3
   B.C.  Health Services, supra, note 2, at paras 91 and 92.  
4
 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016. 
5
 Ibid., at para 20.  
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might be achieved; it has not endorsed any particular system of labour 
relations regulation.6   
 
Courts, unionists, academics, and others have been slow to embrace the idea 
of non-majority, non-exclusive union representation.  Many fear that it would 
breed inter-union rivalry, with unions vying for members in the same 
workplaces.  The Ontario Appeal Court, in Fraser v Ontario, perhaps most 
clearly and publicly articulated this view in stating:  “(i)t is not overstating the 
point to say that to avoid chaos in the workplace to the detriment of the 
employer and employees alike, it is essential that a representative organisation 
be selected on a majoritarian basis and imbued with exclusive bargaining 
rights.”7  Interestingly, the issue involved in this case was whether the 
Agricultural Employees Protection Act (AEPA), enacted in response to the 
Dunmore case to protect the agricultural workers’ collective bargaining rights 
outside of the Ontario Labour Relations Act (LRA) without prescribing majority 
exclusive representation, was constitutional or not.  Although the Appeal Court 
ruled the AEPA unconstitutional, the decision was overturned by the SCC8, 
which stated that “(f)arm workers in Ontario are entitled to meaningful 
processes by which they can pursue workplace goals” even if the “AEPA does 
not provide all the protections the LRA extends to many other workers”9. As 
well, “(l)egislatures are not constitutionally required … to enact laws that set 
up a uniform model of labour relations imposing a statutory duty to bargain in 
good faith, statutory recognition of the principles of exclusive majority 
representation … What is protected is associational activity, not a particular 
process or result.”10  The significance of this recent decision is beyond question 
as it finally brings the issue of non-exclusive representation to the forefront 
and throws into doubt the legality of continuing not allowing such.  It awaits to 
be seen the reactions of the legislatures, given the fact that exclusive 
representation has been in existence for over seven decades and the wide-
spread belief the multiple union representation will inevitably cause problems 
and conflicts. 
 
However, few practitioners or academics, if any, have recognised the opposite 
possibility, that non-majority, non-exclusive representation could actually 
drive unions to collaborate more closely with each other in coping with 
common employer adversaries.  If two or more unions, negotiating for workers 
in the same occupations in the same organisation, had to negotiate with the 
same management, there would be many, and potentially large, benefits to 
                                                          
6
 B.C. Health Services, supra, note 7, at para. 91.  
7
 Fraser v Ontario (Attorney General), 2008 ONCA 760, 92 O.R. (3d) 481 at 92.   
8
  Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20. 
9
  Ibid. at paras 116 & 117. 
10
  Ibid. at 8. 
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cooperating.  Various types of inter-union collaboration, and the potential 
advantages of such collaboration, are reviewed further below.   
 
How much, and what kinds, of inter-union collaboration could be realistically 
expected if Canadian governments provided legislative support to non-
majority, non-exclusive union representation?  New Zealand’s experience of 
such union representation since 1991 is highly suggestive.  Data were collected 
via interview from one or more senior officials in 14 of some of the largest 
unions in New Zealand to gain an understanding of the form and extent of 
inter-union collaboration for the unions interviewed.    
 
Before proceeding, a further point is worth mentioning. Some may wonder 
why inter-union collaboration cannot be examined in Canada.  Although 
Canadian workplaces may have more than one union, the exclusivity principle 
requires these unions to represent different worker groups, typically in 
different locations or occupations, and so they have little in common as a basis 
of cooperation. In contrast, New Zealand’s system of non-majority, non-
exclusive unionism allows co-workers in the same work group to be 
represented by different unions.    
 
THE NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT 
For nearly a century from 1894 to 1991, New Zealand unions were regulated 
by a state-sponsored, compulsory dispute resolution system, which accorded 
them exclusive collective bargaining rights for workers in their bargaining unit 
(exclusive jurisdiction), similar to Canada.  Moreover, union membership was 
basically compulsory for private sector workers during this period, other than 
in the 1930s and early 1980s (Deeks & Boxall, 1989). Sweeping changes then 
came in 1991 with the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act, which in 
effect removed unions’ exclusive bargaining rights, leading to a drastic drop in 
union density and increase in income inequality (Charlwood & Haynes, 2008; 
Podder & Chatterjee, 2002).  Ultimately, to strike a better balance between 
“protecting the integrity of individual choice” and “promoting collective 
bargaining,”11 the Employment Relations Act came into effect in 2000.  Under 
this current system, multiple unions, big or small, may represent workers 
(members only) in the same work units/occupations for bargaining and 
grievances. Only registered unions may legally enter into, or enforce, collective 
agreements, but union registration is not cumbersome. Workers may associate 
with a union and be covered by its collective agreement, or choose to be 
employed on an individual agreement (contract). In other words, the concept 
of open shop applies as “a contract, agreement, or other arrangement 
between persons must not require a person (a) to become or remain a union 
                                                          
11
 Employment Relations Act 2000, s. 3. 
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member of a union, (b) to cease to be a member of a union, or (c) not to 
become a member of a union.”12 Workers on individual contracts, however, 
are entitled to the same terms and conditions of employment as their co-
workers doing the same or similar work under union collective agreements, at 
least for the initial 30 days of employment (where there are multiple unions 
involved, the provisions under the collective agreement with the most union 
members applies).   
 
Why are New Zealand experiences of inter-union collaboration particularly 
relevant to Canada?  New Zealand is similar to Canada in many respects.   First, 
and most obviously, New Zealand and Canada are relatively developed, 
predominantly English-speaking countries.  Second, both are ethnically diverse, 
‘new world’ countries but remain influenced by Britain and its associated legal 
and political traditions. Third, New Zealand and Canada are both liberal market 
economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001) with considerable dependence on resource 
extraction and manufacture.  Fourth, unions in both countries have a business 
orientation, focused on bargaining gains for members rather than broader 
political objectives. Fifth, union density rates, at 30% of the workforce in 
Canada and 21% in New Zealand, are at similar levels (OECD, 2010).  Sixth, and 
perhaps most importantly, Canadian and New Zealand cultural values are also 
similar (Adler, 1994).    
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTER-UNION COOPERATION 
There are a number of reasons why unions may want to cooperate with each 
other.  For instance, there may be gains for the overall labour movement, the 
unions involved, as well as for the membership.  In this section, we examine 
the different areas of collaboration, including collaboration over bargaining, 
organising, policy issues, and others. 
 
COLLABORATION OVER BARGAINING 
Sharing the same workplace can induce unions to collaborate as a strategy to 
counter the employer’s power and improve the union’s bargaining leverage.  
Indeed, 29% of responding worker representatives in the 1980 UK Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey considered joint bargaining an effective means of 
avoiding the problems of ‘divide and rule’ by the employer (Machin, Stewart, 
& Van Reenan, 1993, p.282).  Akkerman (2008) notes that “(w)hen interests 
converge and overlap in membership is absent or only moderate, unions may 
see opportunities to join forces” such as through joint bargaining and 
coordination in strikes (p. 450). Martins (2005), using a model of union 
coalition, concludes that when there are only two unions representing the 
same worker group, cooperation between them resembles a monopoly 
                                                          
12
 Employment Relations Act 2000, s. 8.  
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situation and that “collusion is always superior to competition” from the union 
perspective (p. 371). More specifically, Horn and Wolinsky (1988) demonstrate 
that groups of workers can raise wages by bargaining together if the groups 
are labour substitutes, and by bargaining separately if they are labour 
complements.  So, there are certainly circumstances in which inter-union 
cooperation is beneficial to workers.  
 
Union cooperation over bargaining can take many forms from tacit 
coordination (such as harmonising bargaining agendas, sharing information, 
joint planning and mutual consultation, respect for each other’s picket lines, as 
well as tangible and intangible support to striking members of other unions) to 
formal coalition in bargaining with the same demands, joint negotiation 
process, and common settlement (Hildebrand, 1968).  Moreover, joint union 
negotiation is nothing new, dating at least as far back as the 1880s in the 
American construction industry and 1902 in the American railways 
(Hildebrand, 1968, p. 524).   
 
Cohen (1976) identified at least seven major factors that have stimulated the 
growth of joint or coordinated bargaining.  They are the expansion of 
corporations (and the corresponding increase in employer power), 
centralisation of labour policies in multi-plant companies, union weakness due 
to fragmentation, growth in the complexity of labour relations issues, 
standardization of organisation or industry-wide terms of employment, 
inability of individual unions to push for changes independently, and the need 
to design a bargaining structure that maximises union bargaining power.  
 
COLLABORATION OVER ORGANIZING 
Unionists and industrial relations scholars have been concerned about the 
drastically declining union density rate across much of the developed nations, 
but especially in the US, which has seen private sector union density drop from 
a peak of 35.7% in 1953 to a moribund 7.2% in 2009 (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2010; Troy, 2004, p. 4).  This has prompted many calls for union 
revival, with a heavy emphasis on organising. Schenk (2004) argues that it is 
not enough to simply re-direct resources into organising.  Unions need to 
begin “to work cooperatively on organizing efforts”, ranging from “tacit 
agreements among several unions on sectoral/workplace targets” to “major 
joint organising drives; and establishing organising institutes to bring union 
organisers together for common training and sharing experiences on 
organising successes and failures” (Schneck, 2004. 182-183).  Similarly, Dobson 
(1997) suggests that unions coordinate member recruitment either by jointly 
campaigning for members across an industry or by separately campaigning but 
on the understanding that potential recruits are referred to other unions if 
there is a better occupational match.   
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Where there is overlapping membership coverage, unions are normally 
expected to fight rather than cooperate.   Why?  It is commonly assumed that 
each union wants as large a slice of the membership pie as possible, and so 
competing for members is inevitable. Any thought that they might collaborate 
in organising is therefore dismissed immediately.  However, this premise has 
not been systematically tested and remains questionable for a number of 
reasons.  First, inter-union competition for members is ordinarily kept in check 
by union federation codes of conduct, which require adherence to ‘no 
poaching’ or ‘no raiding’ rules as a condition of membership.   Such ‘no raiding’ 
pacts require unions to forego a degree of self-interest for the sake of 
harmonious co-existence. Second, it makes good sense from the cost-
effectiveness perspective that unions would avoid organising members whose 
occupation or industry are a poor fit with the existing membership base and 
the union’s strategic plans for achieving or maintaining influence over 
employers.  Third, unions are likely to avoid costly conflicts over members, 
because they sap resources and deter non-union workers from joining any 
union.  If conflict is not so dominant, is there room for unions to cooperate, as 
Schenk (2004) and Dobson (1997) have proposed, even if they have 
overlapping coverage of worker groups?  This is certainly an issue worth 
exploring.    
 
COLLABORATION OVER POLICY ISSUES 
Union cooperation is also evident in political lobbying activities, when unions 
share a common social vision (Greer, 2006).  According to Hurd and Pinnock 
(2004, p. 211), “(i)deologically, all unions are tied together by the objective of 
securing workers’ fight in our society”.  Inter-union collaboration increases the 
strength of the labour movement, and a stronger labour movement, in turn, 
helps in influencing “public policy and budgetary decisions at all levels of 
government.”  In particular, at times when government enacts legislation 
perceived as thwarting union representation or rolling back worker gains, it is 
important for unions to engage in joint lobbying, petitioning, and protesting to 
make a more powerful stand and attract more public support.   
 
Joint union actions on policy issues are often facilitated and supported by 
union federations and councils.  These organisations can provide affiliates with 
the leadership resources, and support needed to advocate public policy 
changes for the good of the working class and union solidarity.  They offer 
opportunities for affiliates to meet, interact, and collaborate through, for 
example, the running of workshops, seminars, and conferences.  They can also 
set up specific task forces to work on problem areas, such as health and safety, 
of common interest to several unions and their members.   
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COLLABORATION OVER OTHER AREAS 
Sharing the same workplace can also prompt two or more unions to jointly 
offer common benefits (for example, health insurance and product discounts) 
and services (for example, grievance handling) to their members.  There is also 
the potential for sharing limited resources, such as facilities and equipment.  
Such collaboration provides economies of scale, leading to greater efficiencies 
and cost-effectiveness. Unions can also collaborate by sharing their knowledge 
and expertise, which are often scarce but essential resources.   
 
Overall, although the literature available on union cooperation is not 
extensive, the above review suggests that there are many potentially good 
reasons why unions might want to work with each other.  However, few 
studies have focused specifically on inter-union collaboration in a non-
majority, non-exclusive unionism context.  This is because of the predominant 
focus on conflict in such situations, and because this particular context is 
unavailable for study in North America.  For this reason, we are interested in 
empirically exploring if, when, why, and how unions cooperate in the multi-
union setting of New Zealand.  More specifically, to what extent do unions 
cooperate with each other?  What types of cooperation do they engage in?  
What are the perceived advantages of cooperating? What facilitates 
cooperation? What hinders it? Finally, what policy changes might foster 
greater cooperation across and between unions?  A good understanding of the 
New Zealand union situation has potential lessons for Canada, in terms of 
expected changes to inter-union relations and appropriate policy responses, if 
multiple and non-majority unionism were to receive legislative support.   
 
METHODS 
SAMPLE 
Our sample, as shown in Table 1 (see Appendix) includes 14 of New Zealand’s 
172 registered unions.13  The size of these unions varied from just below 1,000 
to 56,000, which is considered relatively large given that the majority of New 
Zealand’s unions were formed after the passage of the 2000 Employment 
Relations Act and have fewer than 1,000 members (Barry, 2004).  Together, 
these 14 unions represented about 246,800 members (as at August 2008 when 
the data were collected), or roughly 65% of the 382,000 union member 
population in New Zealand (Feinberg-Deniali & Lafferty, 2008, p. 33).   
 
The union sample was selected on the basis of a few key criteria.  First, we 
selected the bigger and more well-established unions, as their insights and 
experiences would likely be more representative of the New Zealand labour 
movement. Therefore, we included in our sample the largest four unions: the 
                                                          
13
 Figure from the Registrar of Unions, Department of Labour, February, 2008 
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PSA (civil service), NZEI (primary school teachers), EPMU (manufacturing and 
other sectors), and NZNO (nurses).  Second, for a similar reason, we need the 
unions to represent a broad range of industries, including, for example, public 
administration (PSA), health care (NZNO), manufacturing (EPMU), and financial 
services (FINSEC).  Third, logistically, the union headquarters had to be easily 
accessible in downtown Wellington, New Zealand’s capital city, so that the 
interviews could be conducted efficiently in terms of both time and cost.   
 
DATA COLLECTION  
We interviewed the senior executives of the unions, usually the general 
secretary or someone in a comparable position.  Semi-structured interviews 
lasting about one hour each were conducted at the unions’ headquarters.  A 
list of the basic interview questions is included in Table 2 (see Appendix).  
Semi-structured interviews allowed us the flexibility to direct attention to 
relevant areas and ask follow-up questions as new information came to light.  
The recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim for detailed analysis, which 
was done separately by the two co-authors in order to ensure independence 
and greater objectivity.  Main themes were identified, coding was done 
accordingly, and key responses were summarised and compared across 
unions.  An iterative process was adopted in the data analysis whereby the 
themes, coding categories, and key findings went through cycles of discussion 
and refinement.  An analysis of the interviews is presented in the next section.  
Although we have no corresponding interview data for Canada, we make 
comparisons to the Canadian context wherever appropriate to set the stage 
for discussing the implications for Canada in the subsequent section. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
There is a lot of collaboration between and among New Zealand unions.  The 
lion’s share of it involves potential rivals in the same sector; close relationships 
are almost exclusively with those who share the same problems and 
opportunities. Unions in unrelated sectors are generally ‘off the radar’ 
completely.   Furthermore, the unions you help, and are closest to, are often 
the unions you have the biggest arguments and fights with, much as in a family 
situation.   Collaboration and conflict are not mutually exclusive; they are part 
and parcel of the same normal relationships.   For instance, two unions in the 
sample squabble over some bargaining and policy issues, and yet routinely join 
forces in presenting a united front to employers or the government.  In several 
respects, the same situation applies to two other pairs of unions in other 
sectors.   
 
Most collaboration relates to bargaining, though some unions cooperate over 
a wide range of issues, even organising.  Their reasons for collaboration 
generally include a desire for more bargaining power to obtain better 
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contractual terms of employment, a more credible voice for lobbying, greater 
cost-effectiveness in organising, and fairness in bargaining outcomes. These 
areas are further discussed in the following analysis.   
 
COLLABORATION OVER BARGAINING 
All 14 unions admitted to some form of cooperation over collective bargaining 
with at least one other union.  Why do they collaborate in bargaining?   Four 
interviewees stated that they collaborate mainly to establish a stronger 
bargaining or lobbying stance.  When unions act in unison, they can exert more 
pressure to get what they want.  In the same vein, two other interviewees 
argued that bargaining together enabled unions to achieve higher wages and 
better conditions through the latent threat of concerted industrial action.  One 
interviewee indicated that “(t)he settlements we have (had) in the last two to 
three years, when the cooperation has grown, are .... a good percentage point 
on average higher (than settlements) in the previous years.”   
 
Two interviewees also pointed out that bargaining together was fairer, 
because it meant the same outcomes for the same types of workers or better 
outcomes for unskilled workers.  One interviewee made several remarks about 
this, of which the following was typical:  “And so unskilled workers have to 
strike just to be able to get a decent tea break, and when you bring all of those 
unions together under an agreement that says there are certain principles, 
then the gains for unskilled workers can be much greater.”  The other 
interviewee said “ I think that was the other unions benefiting from our union, 
actually.  Yeah!  And certainly the less skilled staff benefited from this situation 
affecting more skilled staff.  And you know the insistence by the unions that 
new money had to be given to less skilled staff as well, even if it was a lesser 
proportion.” In a related point, interviewees claimed that coordinated or joint 
bargaining was particularly advantageous, and hence appealing, to weaker 
unions.  This point is potentially very relevant to Canada.  Under current 
Canadian labour laws, weaker unions representing vulnerable workers often 
cannot even get certified as exclusive bargaining agents, because they lack 
majority support.  In contrast, a multi-union system like New Zealand’s offers 
opportunities for establishing a workplace presence from a much more limited 
membership base while leveraging collaborations with other, more powerful 
unions to secure better terms and conditions for their poorly paid members.     
 
As for the degree of collaboration in bargaining, it varies considerably.  At one 
extreme, unions only share bargaining information and there is no joint 
coordination; bargaining occurs independently and at different times.   For 
instance, five unions share a lot of bargaining-related information with their 
rivals. The following remark was typical: “we let them know when our 
bargaining is happening and what sort of money we’re getting.”  One of these 
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five unions even allows its much smaller rival to observe the actual 
negotiations.  Why share information?  Most unions shared information as a 
courtesy, a goodwill gesture of potential benefit to the recipient union.    
However, one union stated that information sharing was a first step towards 
closer coordination in bargaining.  Another union suggested that information 
sharing, especially about positive outcomes achieved through bargaining, 
enabled it to covertly market its services to other unions’ members.  At the 
time of data collection, a large union had just received an interesting request 
from a couple of smaller unions to provide them with training and advocacy in 
bargaining.  Thinking that “the more allies you have got, the better”, the union 
was actively considering the request and seemingly favourably disposed to it. 
A higher level of bargaining collaboration involves coordination of bargaining 
claims and demands, as well as strategies and tactics.  Eight of the 14 unions 
indicated that they engaged in some form of joint coordination. Most 
commonly, they tried to negotiate at roughly the same time and/or with the 
same kinds of bargaining demands.  For instance, one official admitted that “... 
we always sit down and have pre-bargaining sessions ... Each union brings their 
own log of claims, and (we) sit down and identify what each union must have 
.... and what we might support and what we might not necessarily ... support.”  
However, coordinated strike action was much less common.  Only two of the 
unions admitted to ever having jointly decided to strike against the same 
employer at the same time.  A third union had offered support to a striking 
union by not crossing its picket lines. A fourth union indicated that its 
members had provided a striking union with moral support, mostly through 
letters and emails.   
 
The highest level of collaboration entails joint bargaining for a multi-union 
collective agreement or MUCA.  Thirteen of the 14 unions indicated that they 
had negotiated MUCAs with one or more other unions. For some, MUCAs 
represent a high proportion of all collective agreements. In one case, MUCAs 
were 85% of all collective agreement, and in two others, approximately 40%.   
For others, MUCAs play a less important role.   Three unions used MUCAs for 
about 20% of their agreements, and four used them for about 10%.  Three 
unions used them less than five percent of the time.  As a general rule, MUCAs 
were employed if unions had overlapping membership coverage and so shared 
representation. As an example, one union reported having overlapping 
coverage, or nonexclusive representation, for 25% of its collective agreements.  
MUCAs were used in 80% of these overlapping coverage situations, or roughly 
20% of all collective agreements.  In contrast, unions which had few MUCAs 
normally had sole bargaining representation for 80% or more of their collective 
agreements.   In one typical case, one large union bargained alone for the 80% 
of agreements where it had no overlapping bargaining coverage with other 
unions.  Where coverage overlapped, the union coordinated bargaining with 
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other unions for about 10% of agreements, and jointly negotiated a MUCA for 
the other 10% of agreements.  However, there are exceptions.  One of the 
large unions seldom engages with other unions in any form of coordination.   
Why?  Basically, it is the dominant union in almost all workplaces.  As a result, 
getting together with anyone else offers little prospect of increasing strike 
power, resources, or expertise.   On the downside, bargaining coalitions mean 
higher transaction costs, longer delays, sharing control over bargaining, and 
more opportunities for a rival to take unwarranted credit for good settlement 
outcomes.  Another union, the only one not to have negotiated any MUCAs, 
gave similar reasons for not coordinating or jointly negotiating with its puny 
rival.   
 
MUCAs play a much more limited role in the Canadian context, given exclusive 
bargaining representation.  When unions do coordinate their bargaining, it is 
generally across different bargaining units, in different occupations and/or 
locations, but all working for the same employer.  A more common practice in 
the Canadian context is leap-frogging, where unions representing different 
groups of workers in different bargaining units nevertheless compare 
settlements and attempt to out-do each other in obtaining higher increases 
and greater improvements from the same or similar employers.   
 
COLLABORATION OVER ORGANISING  
Nine of the 14 unions had helped their rivals with recruitment. All nine had 
referred prospective members to other unions in a better position to service 
particular types of members, because of bargaining coverage, bargaining unit 
size, and/or industrial/occupational fit.  The following was a typical comment 
about this practice:  “…it just didn’t feel ethically right to take the membership 
of ... another occupation and not offer them the full advantages of being in our 
union.  So, we made a very explicit decision to.... say you have to go ... and to 
support them moving out to a different union.”  One union helped fund a 
weaker union’s organising campaigns.  Several unions had each campaigned to 
recruit members for all unions in the sector.  Other unions had divvied up the 
recruitment task, so that one union had recruited for two unions, itself and a 
potential rival in one workplace, and, as a quid pro quo, the other union had 
done the same in an alternative workplace.   
 
Four interviewees felt that collaboration was essential to membership 
recruitment, given the scale economies of organising and the negative effects 
of unions competing for members on workers’ willingness to join any union.  
One interviewee had this to say:  “My observation and experience always is, 
particularly when non-members see at least two unions squabbling with each 
other, they just turn off.  I’ve had that feedback, not just from non-members, 
but members as well.” Another interviewee made a similar comment:  “...(o)ur 
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union’s view is that active contestability essentially only leads to de-
unionisation and, as a result of that, we have a pretty clear policy that we will 
not actively contest other unions.”   
 
In an exclusive bargaining system like Canada’s, helping another union recruit 
can severely jeopardise one’s own survival. In fact, the winner-take-all 
character of this system promotes fierce competition among unions.  Raiding 
situations are not uncommon, in which one union seeks to use the 
certification/decertification process to displace an incumbent union as the sole 
agent for a particular bargaining unit. The worst thing about raiding is that 
both unions, incumbent and raider, can lose out if neither is certified, leaving 
the workers in a particular bargaining unit with no union representation at all.  
According to a U.S. study, this happens in 11% of all raiding situations (Scott, 
Arnold & Odewahn, 1992).    
   
COLLABORATION OVER POLICY  
Ten interviewees indicated that they had cooperated in some way with other 
unions to change government policy.  When unions speak as one, their voice 
becomes more credible.  In general, policy-oriented unions had more than one 
way of trying to influence government jointly with other unions.   Most of this 
inter-union cooperation was limited to just three sectors, with the government 
acting as employer in two of these.  All three sectors are heavily unionised.   
 
Six interviewees indicated that they worked through the NZCTU to lobby 
government. All had participated in NZCTU-organised workshops, councils, 
committees, and/or forums.  Many of these concentrate exclusively on the 
problems of particular industries.   
 
Seven interviewees indicated that their union had worked closely with 
employers and the government in tripartite structures to develop and/or 
implement policies for their industry.   In one case, the employers, unions, and 
relevant ministry discussed the “(f)uture needs of the industry and, in 
particular, the amount of labour requirements and capacity,” especially 
training capacity.  Another tripartite group focused on the registration and 
discipline of professionals in the industry.  Yet another discussed “... a whole 
range of issues: staffing, funding, (and) resourcing.”   With one union, the focus 
was more operational, with the parties agreeing on how they were going to 
interact with each other and make decisions. Finally, joint action in one 
industry had been precipitated by a ministerial inquiry into health and safety.   
Seven interviewees said that their union had joined forces with at least one 
other union to lobby government directly for policy change.  For instance, one 
union had coalesced with another to petition parliament.  In a different 
situation, two unions had successfully lobbied parliament to have a proposed 
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funding structure revoked.  Two other unions had made joint select committee 
submissions, opposing or supporting various bills before Parliament.  Finally, as 
Labour Party affiliates, several unions had used party channels to speak more 
directly and less publicly to senior ministers about their policy concerns.   
 
In Canada, interactions between unions are less frequent, because unions do 
not serve the same bargaining groups and so have less in common.  As such, 
coordination over policy areas is accomplished largely through labour 
federations, or among different locals within the same national union, rather 
than directly between individual unions.  
 
OTHER COLLABORATION  
Unions also cooperate in other ways.  Four unions hold joint branch meetings 
with other unions.  One union provides free advice to other unions’ members 
via its call centre.  Two unions share the same offices in one city.  Three unions 
work with other unions in their industry on human resource issues as diverse 
as training, health and safety, and dismissal.  Several unions have signed so-
called relationship agreements to work with each other in good faith.  Two 
unions, ASTE and AUS, had even agreed to amalgamate, something that had 
already occurred at the time of writing.   
 
INHIBITING FACTORS  
The interviewees identified several factors which had prevented them from 
collaborating more often and on a greater scale with other unions. Five 
interviewees blamed personality conflicts, usually between union leaders, for 
creating barriers to cooperation.  Many of these personality conflicts were 
historical, reflecting clashes over events that had in some cases occurred 
decades earlier.  In some cases, these fights had been generated by so-called 
turf protection, with union leaders anxious to preserve their own high-ranking 
jobs.   
 
Three interviewees talked of snobbery and elitism, often associated with pay 
differentials between the members of one union and another, as an 
impediment to working together. Another interviewee felt that the many, 
small, company unions14 in his industry simply didn’t have the expertise to 
meaningfully collaborate, especially with respect to lobbying over policy issues.  
Five interviewees cited differences in union culture, reflected in member 
attitudes and values, as a major hurdle to developing positive relationships 
with rival unions.  As one union official put it, “(t)here is, rightly or wrongly, ... 
a perception of a difference of culture between the two unions.  ... (Our union) 
                                                          
14
 Company unions, also referred to as house or yellow unions, can be registered as 
bona fide unions under New Zealand law.   
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has been regarded as more militant.”  Three interviewees argued that weak 
unions were often reluctant to work with stronger counterparts, for fear of 
losing members to these rivals.  One interviewee further commented that 
small unions might see collaboration in a situation of unbalanced power as 
more like a takeover.  Two unions in the same sector both blamed sensational 
media reporting for generating occasional frictions between them.    
 
In contrast to Canada, smaller unions still normally fare better in New Zealand, 
even if they feel over-shadowed by their larger counterparts.  At least, they 
can easily and quickly establish bargaining representation rights with as few as 
two union members in a given workplace, and then gradually build their 
membership base over time (Harcourt and Haynes, 2011).  Unlike Canadian 
unions, they do not have to have the hefty resources to launch a certification 
drive and/or fight a certification election. Personality conflicts and union 
culture differences exist everywhere and, in this respect, Canada and New 
Zealand are unlikely to differ substantially. The legislative framework, 
however, certainly affects the opportunities for unions to work together, with 
Canada’s situation at the lower end.  
    
ENABLING FACTORS  
The union officials identified a number of factors which had facilitated 
cooperation between and among the unions.  Some of these involved law 
changes, brought about by the 2000 Employment Relations Act.  For example, 
two officials thought that the special legal provisions for multi-union collective 
agreements (MUCAs) in the Act had made joint collective bargaining easier.    
Similarly, five interviewees felt that the good faith provisions in the 2000 
Employment Relations Act had induced unions to act more openly and 
honestly with each other.  One official explained it this way:  “So it has made a 
difference ... knowing that good faith applies between unions as well.  We 
often trot that out ourselves to unions that are difficult.  (We say) ‘listen, we 
are bound by this’.” Three officials spoke more generally, arguing that the 
more supportive environment for collective bargaining, ushered in by the 2000 
Employment Relations Act, had encouraged unions to collaborate rather than 
compete. 
  
Five officials acknowledged the key role employers can play in getting the 
unions together.  Four claimed that, with the Labour Government in power, 
public sector employers were far more committed to working cooperatively 
with all stakeholder groups, including unions.  One official put it this way:  “(if 
there had been)  ...no chance of a (government-sponsored) tripartite forum, 
for example, we (would) not even meet with the other union.”   Two union 
leaders also suggested that some employers, keen to reduce the transaction 
costs of contracting and stop the leap-frogging of settlements, had pushed 
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unions into coordinated and/or joint bargaining.  For example, one official 
noted that “... if it is two unions, they just want to have one bargaining round, 
one collective agreement; make it simple...” However, three officials 
commented that, in their experience, employers often prefer to deal with 
unions separately.  Sometimes, this is part of a ‘divide and rule’ strategy to 
weaken unions.   Sometimes, this reflects a desire to avoid being accused of 
bad faith or of having violated workers’ freedom of association.   
 
Other officials attributed collaboration to factors associated with the labour 
movement itself.  Four ascribed a key role to the NZCTU in bringing about 
inter-union dialogue. The NZCTU policy groups were seen as critical to inducing 
unions in the same industry to meet, discuss, and formulate concrete policy 
proposals for government.   In addition, the NZCTU’s protocols were lauded for 
preventing and resolving petty disputes over organising members, and 
encouraging unions to re-focus on ‘bigger picture’ issues.   Former NZCTU boss, 
Ross Wilson, was heavily praised for fostering inter-union cooperation.   On a 
smaller scale, other union bosses were also praised for their team-building 
personalities.   
 
In comparison, Canada does not have the legislative framework to support 
MUCAs. Furthermore, the notion of good faith only applies to union-
management relationships, and not to union-union relationships.  Tripartite 
forums are not common, and government involvement is generally limited to 
the conciliation of bargaining impasses.  The one similarity between Canada 
and New Zealand is the role of the trade union federation(s) in promoting and 
supporting positive relationships among unions. If Canada were to adopt a 
non-exclusive representation system, this role would likely grow in 
significance.   
  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MORE COLLABORATION   
The interviewees had some suggestions for increasing inter-union 
collaboration. Three officials felt that the NZCTU should play a stronger role in 
developing and implementing coordinated bargaining and organising 
strategies for different sectors of the economy.  The general belief was that 
the NZCTU should be better resourced to carry out such roles, though no one 
was clear on how this might be done.  No direct government policy change was 
envisioned in achieving this goal.  As one union official said, “(t)here are a lot 
of things that could happen to promote collaboration.  The bigger question is 
could you actually regulate or policy-prescribe those things and I am not sure 
that you could.”  Another echoed a similar view:  “I think we have to do it 
(facilitating greater collaboration) ourselves.  I don’t think you can legislate for 
it completely. It’s a battle that has got to go on inside the (labour) movement.” 
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Some suggestions focused on enhancing the power and effectiveness of joint 
action in order to make it more meaningful and potentially attractive.  For, 
instance, two officials favoured legalising secondary picketing; another 
supported legalising secondary strikes.  Likewise, two officials felt that more 
unions would collaborate in bargaining, if it were easier to opt for a multi-
employer collective agreement or MECA.  Specifically, they favoured leaving 
this decision to union executives rather than having it decided through a 
membership ballot.   
 
Other officials felt that collaboration would be easier, if there were fewer 
potential rivals and these rivals were larger, stronger, better resourced, and 
clearly not aligned with management.   Five officials recommended that, as a 
condition of registration, every union should have to satisfy a minimum size 
requirement, possibly of as few as 100 members.  One official provided the 
following justification for this stance:   “(a) lot of people have said maybe 
greater membership, minimum membership.   The reason they are saying that 
is because they think some of the defensive posturing by some of the unions is 
related to their small size... power. They are too weak, and they see 
cooperation as a takeover.”  Three union bosses also argued that the 
Department of Labour should periodically audit unions to ensure that they are 
democratically controlled and financially self-sufficient, and not therefore 
dependent upon management.   
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
What can Canada learn from New Zealand’s experiment with non-majority, 
non-exclusive union representation, which began with the enactment of the 
1991 Employment Contracts Act?  Several major findings emerge from this 
exploratory study. Perhaps the most important is that inter-union 
collaboration is pervasive in the multi-union setting of New Zealand.  
Moreover, collaboration extends across bargaining, organising, and policy-
related activities like lobbying.  Almost all of it occurs within sectors, inasmuch 
as unions are united by common industry-related concerns.  There is conflict as 
well, to be sure, but this is occasional and mostly subdued.15  When asked 
about inter-union conflicts, the same 14 union executives generally perceived 
these as minor irritants rather than as anything major.  Unions tended to avoid 
fighting with each other, because to do so would violate NZCTU protocols, 
waste resources, and frighten potential members away. Active poaching of 
members was surprisingly uncommon. Some unions even had informal 
agreements about recruitment along occupational or industry boundaries to 
avoid conflicts.  Moreover, most felt that there was little to be gained from 
aggressive inter-union competition, since there was no North American-style 
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 Inter-union conflict is the focus of another paper.   
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certification system which would enable a raiding union to completely 
supplant a rival incumbent and acquire its exclusive representation rights in a 
given bargaining unit.  When conflicts did occur, which happened from time to 
time, unions would usually resolve disagreements informally among 
themselves, sometimes with the help of the NZCTU.  As such, any fears of 
serious union rivalry, arising out of non-majority, non-exclusive unionism, may 
be largely unfounded.  Countries like Canada should therefore at least consider 
the feasibility of minority and multi-union representation. 
 
The New Zealand unions interviewed, much like many of their British 
counterparts (Machin, Stewart, & Van Reenen, 1993), generally believe that 
they can get more of what they want by speaking with one voice and by 
making the same or similar demands simultaneously.  It makes more sense to 
work together to increase the size of the proverbial pie, far less to squabble 
about respective shares.  As Martins (2005, p. 371) says, “collusion is always 
superior to competition” from a union viewpoint.  Interestingly, this logic 
applies just as much to organising as bargaining, contrary to the common 
Canadian belief that overlapping coverage would only lead to inter-union 
fighting over members. The unions in this study often help each other with 
recruitment, and usually sufficiently respect another union’s established 
presence in a given workplace not to poach its members.  It is usually more 
cost-effective for a union to specialise in representing large numbers of 
workers in particular workplaces than to divert its efforts and resources into 
poaching small numbers of members from rival unions, especially if there is no 
obvious benefit to the labour movement, overall. Furthermore, it is a 
commonly held belief that fighting over members only leads to de-
unionisation, and so is in no union’s interest.   
 
If anything, nonexclusive representation, or overlapping coverage as it is called 
in New Zealand, drives unions to cooperate even more closely, especially in 
bargaining.  Specifically, when two or more unions represent the same group 
of workers, they are likely to bargain together for a multi-union collective 
agreement.  At the very least, some form of joint coordination or information 
sharing can usually be expected.  The exception is the generally large union 
which represents a high proportion of a given group of workers compared to 
its much smaller rival or rivals.  In this situation, the dominant union typically 
feels that the perceived benefits of joint action, in terms of increased 
bargaining power, are outweighed by the costs, in terms of delays, decision-
making difficulties, and the loss of kudos to the other union(s) for having 
bargained a good settlement.    
 
Certain institutions have helped facilitate collaboration.  Perhaps chief among 
these is the multi-union collective agreement or MUCA.  The procedures in the 
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2000 Employment Relations Act have made it easy for union executives to opt 
for a MUCA; very crucially, employers cannot stop them from doing so. The 
law also requires unions to treat each other in good faith, and, in particular, 
not to deliberately mislead or deceive each other. Likewise, the NZCTU 
provides various councils, forums, workshops, and working groups to facilitate 
dialogue between unions, especially when they occupy the same sector.  It has 
also developed highly effective protocols for resolving disputes between 
affiliates, especially over the organizing of each other’s members.   These 
protocols provide a procedure for repatriating recently arrived members 
defecting from a rival union, which requires both unions to mutually address 
the issues that prompted the members to leave.   
 
So, what are the implications for Canada?  Since having a non-majority, non-
exclusive union representation system has the potential to offer major 
benefits for unions and workers through union collaboration and freedom of 
association, and there are some exploratory findings in a parallel study by the 
authors which suggest that inter-union conflict under such a system is far from 
severe, moving towards a more open representational regime allowing for 
minority unions may be at least worth considering. Certainly, overhauling the 
existing Canadian system would cause uneasiness for many people, particularly 
for unions which have already established themselves as exclusive bargaining 
agents.  Moreover, with Canadian union density fairly stable at about 30% of 
the non-agricultural paid workforce (Human Resources and Skills Development 
Canada, 2011), there are definitely some good protective measures in the 
current system worth retaining.  Hence, rather than just maintain the status 
quo or move to an entirely new representational system like New Zealand’s, a 
third course, a blend of Canada’s and New Zealand’s systems, could provide 
major representational improvements.  Under this proposed hybrid, the 
existing system of exclusive representation for all unions able to obtain 
majority support ‘on the cards’ or through an election would be preserved.  
Established unions, which had secured representation status possibly decades 
ago, would not therefore be threatened by the possibility of newly arrived 
union raiders attracting their members and draining their resources.  
Maintenance of this arrangement is also compatible with ILO standards, as 
already stated in the introduction of this paper.   
 
For workplaces without majority support for any particular union, the hybrid 
system would allow unions with minority support to represent workers on a 
members-only basis, thereby offering more options to workers and respecting 
individuals’ freedom to associate with their preferred union.  Free-riding would 
be limited, as only members would qualify for union services like grievance 
handling.  Members-only representation would also focus union attention on 
effectively serving their members as a strategy to build and grow their support 
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base. Individual workers not wanting union representation could remain on 
individual employment contracts.  If minority unions wanted to work together, 
they could coordinate their bargaining and enter into a multi-union agreement 
with the same employer.  At the same time, they would have the same rights 
as majority unions to access the workplace to serve their members, to strike 
over an expired collective agreement, and to be protected from discriminatory 
or unfair labour practices by the employer.   
 
This hybrid system would make it much easier to organise traditional non-
union sectors like banking and insurance, where it has been difficult to 
establish majority support, especially for a new union trying to enter the 
workplace.  Initial minority representation would then act as a springboard for 
majority representation later on, as more workers get to know about their 
union and the benefits it offers.  Under this hybrid system, union density 
would inevitably rise, with membership numbers in currently represented 
workplaces remaining unchanged, and new members added in currently 
unrepresented workplaces, following the spread of minority unionism.  
Overall, Canadian workers would gain from the greater availability of, and 
access to, collective representation.   
 
If and when a minority union subsequently gained majority support, it would 
acquire the rights, benefits, and duties of an exclusive agent.   For example, it 
would have the right to negotiate union security clauses, as well as the duty to 
fairly represent all members of the bargaining unit in bargaining and grievance 
handling.  The current system for majority unions would be maintained, while 
allowing and supporting a separate, parallel system for minority unions.  The 
legislative changes required to enact this hybrid system would be minimal, 
involving a few additional provisions to the existing labour relations statutes. If 
New Zealand employers can handle a totally non-exclusive representation 
system, allowing multiple union agents, Canadian employers should be able to 
handle a hybrid system where workplaces with majority support still only had 
one union.   
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As an exploratory study of inter-union collaboration, only 14 interviews with 
union executives were conducted. On the one hand, 65% of New Zealand’s 
union members belong to these 14 unions, and so their experiences are in 
many ways representative of the labour movement as a whole.  On the other, 
the sample comprises none of the very small unions, which together still 
account for a significant portion of union members (Barry, 2004). These unions 
may have very different views of, and approaches to, collaboration.  As some 
interviewees have indicated, smaller unions may fear losing members or being 
taken over, if they start collaborating with larger rivals.  At the other extreme, 
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smaller unions may benefit substantially from the greater resources and 
expertise of the larger unions, if they opt to affiliate or work with them.  This 
would be an interesting area for future research.  
 
Union collaboration is certainly dynamic.  Although the current study did touch 
on historical aspects, it is mostly a snap shot of the current situation.  It would 
be useful to study how unions develop relationships with others, and how 
these relationships evolve over time, particularly with changing environmental 
factors. For example, with the global financial meltdown in 2008, are unions 
tending to work together more or less than before?   
 
This study is also limited by its total focus on New Zealand.  Its findings may 
need to be corroborated by studies of other nations with non-majority, non-
exclusive representation. Better yet, a comparative study across different 
nations with such representation would help identify what is typical and what 
is not in New Zealand’s experience of multi-unionism.  The studies could look 
at both the collaboration and conflict aspects of the inter-union relationship. 
For the next stage of research, the authors plan to develop and administer a 
broader and more comprehensive survey of all New Zealand unions, which 
would capture the views of not just the large unions, but also the smaller ones.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Inter-union collaboration is a common phenomenon in New Zealand, where a 
non-exclusive, non-majority union representation system has been adopted 
and multiple unions may represent members of the same worker group.  
Collaboration over bargaining was found to be the most pervasive form of 
collaboration, and common to all the unions interviewed.   It ranged from tacit 
coordination through information sharing to joint bargaining for a multi-union 
collective agreement. Most unions also collaborated over policy issues, 
particularly when lobbying the government.  The most intriguing finding was 
that unions actually cooperated in organising members too.  Contrary to the 
belief that multi-unionism prompts competition and chaos, the unions in this 
sample were generally respectful of each other’s territory and expertise and 
comfortable to organise only in areas that made the most sense, in terms of 
both effective representation for the workers and cost-effectiveness for the 
unions.  Some unions are even willing to recruit for each other, and refer 
potential members to other unions if there is a better fit.   
 
The results of this exploratory research and the discussion of the merits of a 
potential hybrid system should help to allay fears about the supposed perils of 
Canada moving away from its majority-based, exclusive union representation 
system. Under the hybrid model proposed, new and existing unions with 
exclusive representation rights predicated on majority support would remain 
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relatively protected. The big gain for both workers and unions would be in 
other workplaces where majority union support has not been established.  The 
hybrid system affords workers in such workplaces the opportunity to freely 
associate with their preferred union and obtain the collective power to bargain 
with their employer. In terms of advancing workplace democracy, such a 
change can only be a positive one.  Therefore, at the very least, we hope that 
what we have found and proposed in this study will prompt unionists, 
academics, and law-makers to question the rationale for rigidly adhering to the 
status quo of exclusive representation based on majority support, and consider 
alternative, more open bargaining regimes which may have a lot more to offer.     
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1 
UNIONS 
 
Amalgamated Workers Union       
 
Association of Senior Medical Specialists (ASMS)   
 
Association of Staff in Tertiary Education (ASTE)    
 
Association of University Staff (AUS)       
 
Engineering, Printing, and Manufacturing Union (EPMU)   
       
Financial and Information Workers Union (FINSEC)    
  
Maritime Union of New Zealand (MUNZ)      
 
New Zealand Merchant Service Guild      
 
New Zealand Nurses Organisation (NZNO)     
 
New Zealand Educational Institute (NZEI)     
 
New Zealand Post Primary Teachers Association    
(NZPPTA)          
 
Police Association         
        
Public Service Association (PSA)    
 
Rail & Maritime Transport Union (RMTU)      
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TABLE 2 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. How much cooperation/ collaboration is there between your union and 
other unions?   
 
2. What is the nature of the cooperation (eg is it on-going or ad hoc, is it 
about joining forces, or administrative convenience, etc?) 
 
3. Why does your union cooperate/ collaborate with other unions?  What are 
the causes of cooperation/ collaboration between your union and other 
unions?   
 
4. To what extent is cooperation/ collaboration between your union and 
other unions an advantage or benefit (eg a source of strength, a way of 
conserving resources)?  
 
5. How do you cooperate?  How do you make it work?   
 
6. What factors (eg policies, practices of unions, employers, government etc), 
if any, facilitate cooperation/ collaboration between your union and other 
unions?   
 
7. What factors (eg policies, practices of unions, employers, governments 
etc), if any, hinder or discourage cooperation / collaboration between your 
union and other unions?   
 
8. What changes (eg in practices or policies), if any, would facilitate greater 
collaboration/ cooperation between your union and other unions?   
 
